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NOTE
SHOOT FIRST, ASK LATER:
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS AT THE
BORDER AFTER BOUMEDIENE
BRITTANY DAVIDSON*
Adopting Boumediene's functional approach in analyzing extraterritorial
application of the United States Constitution at the U.S.-Mexico border will
promote uniformity and provide guidance to courts and officials. Currently,
courts are applying Verdugo-Urquidez's sufficient connections test, and
different variations thereof permitting courts to arbitrarily decide who is
entitled to constitutional protection in the absence of uniform precedent.
Adopting Boumediene as the guiding test will not automatically trigger
constitutional protection, instead, constitutional protection will only be
granted if extending protection to an alien at the U.S.-Mexico border is
justified based on the three-prong test.
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INTRODUCTION
On June 7, 2010, a fifteen-year-old Mexican national, Sergio Adrian
Hernandez Guereca, and his friends were playing a game on the
Mexican side of a cement culvert that separates Mexico from the United
States.' The game was "finning up the incline of the culvert, touching
the barbed-wire fence separating Mexico and the United States, and
then running back down the incline."2 United States Border Patrol
Agent, Jesus Mesa, Jr., approached the group of friends during the
game, and detained one of them.' Hernandez ran behind a bridge's
pillar in Mexico to avoid also being seen and detained by Agent Mesa."
For no apparent reason, once Agent Mesa detained Hernandez's friend,
and while standing in the United States, he turned and fired gunshots at
Hernandez, who was still in Mexico.5 One of Agent Mesa's gunshots hit
Hernandez directly in his head, killing him instantaneously.6
Hernandez's parents sued the United States, Agent Mesa, and
unknown federal employees for their son's death, asserting eleven
claims, including violations of Hernandez's Fourth and Fifth
1. Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2014), affd on reh'g,




5. Id. at 255; see id. at 278-79 (indicating that Agent Mesa had no reason to
believe the use of deadly force wasjustified or even required).
6. Id. at 255.
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Amendment rights against the use of excessive, deadly force.7 The
Fifth Circuit denied Hernandez Fourth Amendment protection on
two grounds: first, the plain meaning of "the people" in the text of
the Fourth Amendment precluded protection of Hernandez because
the right extends only to U.S. citizens; and second, even if Hernandez
could bring a Fourth Amendment claim, under the sufficient
connections test enumerated in United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez,8 he
lacked a sufficient connection to the United States to trigger
constitutional protection.9 The court, however, granted Hernandez
Fifth Amendment protection under the Due Process Clause because
the term "any person" in the Amendment includes both U.S. citizens
and aliens.'" Additionally, the court applied the three-factor test
from Boumediene v. Bush"-which analyzes: the citizenship and status
of the alien-detainee; the nature of the site where the incident
occurred; and practical obstacles in awarding constitutional
protection-to extend constitutional protection to Hernandez.2
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit reheard the case, en
banc, in 2015 to determine whether Agent Mesa was entitled to
7. Id. The parents brought seven claims under the Federal Tort Claims Act; two
claims under the Fourth and Fifth Amendments for failing to adopt reasonable
procedures regarding the use of deadly force and use of force during arrests; one
claim under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 389 (1971), for violating his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights against the use
of deadly force; and one claim under the Alien Tort Statute. Although his parents
successfully petitioned the Fifth Circuit's ruling, see Hernandez v. United States, 771
F.3d 818 (5th Cir. 2014) (per curiam) (granting petition for rehearing en banc), on
rehearing, the court affirmed its holding that Hernandez lacked "significant
voluntary connection" to the United States, therefore barring him from asserting a
Fourth Amendment claim. Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 119 (5th Cir.
2015), petition for cert. filed sub nom. Hernandez v. Mesa (July 23, 2015) (No. 15-118).
8. 494 U.S. 259 (1990).
9. See generally Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 263, 265 (emphasizing that the court was
unwilling to ignore a Supreme Court decision, United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. 259 (1990), unless directed to do so by the Court). While the Fifth Circuit did not
entitle Hernandez to Fourth Amendment protection, it noted the Supreme Court's
recognition that the meaning of "the people" was not conclusive in deciding whether the
Fourth Amendment applied in Verdugo-Urquider. Id. at 266. Instead, the court relied on
the totality of circumstances-which included prior precedent, history of the Fourth
Amendment, and practical considerations--in light of the Boumediene and Verdugo-
Urquidez rulings to preclude Fourth Amendment protection. Id. at 266.
10. Id. at 268.
11. 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008).
12. See generally Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 268 (arguing that "persons" in the text of the
Fifth Amendment can be applied to any person and, consequently, "Verdugo-Urquidez's
sufficient connections test, which provides a gloss for the term 'the people,' does not
apply in interpreting the extraterritorial application of the Fifth Amendment").
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qualified immunity.3 The Fifth Circuit affirmed its previous dismissal
of Fourth Amendment protection to Hernandez by finding that he
failed to allege a constitutional violation. 4 Additionally, the court
reversed its prior grant of Fifth Amendment protection to Hernandez
by ruling that he did not clearly establish a right to any constitutional
protection and that Agent Mesa could not reasonably have known that
his conduct would have potentially violated the Constitution. " At the
close of the opinion, the Fifth Circuit left open the possibility that
Verdugo-Urquidez is not the sole authority in determining
extraterritoriality and, in the future, Boumediene may be the correct
avenue in pursuing claims of extraterritorial constitutional violations. 16
Tragically, Hernandez's death is just one example of the vast
history of U.S. Border Patrol abuse of discretion at the U.S.-Mexico
border.'7 The Supreme Court has yet to clearly establish whether the
Constitution protects foreign nationals, located outside U.S. territory,
who are injured by U.S. officials. 8 In 1990, the Court in Verdugo-
Urquidez first confronted the question of to what extent the
Constitution applies to an alien in a foreign territory when U.S.
agents are involved. The Court applied a "sufficient connections" test
to deny constitutional protection to a foreign national, who was
seized by Mexican officials in Mexico then transported to the United
States for trial.' 9 The sufficient connections test requires courts to
determine whether a foreign national established sufficient,
significant relations to the United States to be entitled to
constitutional protection.2" Almost two decades later, in Boumediene,
the Court rejected Verdugo-Urquidez's ufficient connections test and
13. Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 119 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
14. Id.
15. Id. at 119-20.
16. Id. at 120-21 ("Reasonable minds can differ on whether Boumediene may
someday be xplicitly extended as [Hernandez] urge [s].").
17. See Ambar Carvalho, Comment, The Sliding Scale Approach to Protecting Nonresident
Immigrants Against the Use of Excessive Force in Violation of the Fourth Amendment, 22 EMORY
INT'L L. REv. 247, 262-63 (2008) (stating that "[m]any Mexican nationals are found
dead at or near the U.S.-Mexico border every year[-] approximately 3,000 immigrants
died between 1990 and 2002,"-and pointing to Border Patrol's broad enforcement
powers, allowing agents to "express their frustration through blows and insults," as the
primary danger for Mexican nationals at the border).
18. See Eva L. Bitran, Note, Boumediene at the Border? The Constitution and Foreign
Nationals on the U.S.-Mexico Border, 49 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 229, 231 (2014)
(recognizing that the question of whether foreign nationals immediately outside U.S.
territory are entitled to constitutional protection has received no scholarly attention).
19. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 271, 274-75 (1990).
20. Id. at 271.
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instead created a functional approach to determine whether the
Constitution applies extraterritorially.21 The Court applied a three-
factor test to grant the petition for a writ of habeas corpus of enemy
combatants held in Guantanamo Bay.1
2
The Fifth Circuit, en banc, ruled incorrectly when it denied
Hernandez Fourth Amendment protection. The court's ruling is
objectionable on two grounds: it did not interpret the Fourth
Amendment's text, "the people," in light of the Framers' intent when
creating the Constitution; and it incorrectly chose to apply Verdugo-
Urquidez's sufficient connections test because Boumediene's functional
approach is a more uniform and instructive test for application at the
U.S.-Mexico border.2" To inhibit U.S. Border Patrol agents' use of
excessive force at the U.S.-Mexico border, and consequently, to
prevent the loss of innocent lives, the Court should adopt
Boumediene's functional approach to determine extraterritorial
application of the Constitution at the border.
24
This Note argues that the Constitution provides Fourth
Amendment protection to aliens at the U.S.-Mexico border against
the use of excessive deadly force by U.S. Border Patrol Agents. Part II
of this Note begins by looking at the Framer's interpretation of "the
people" in the Fourth Amendment, specifically concerning their
intent to create a Constitution that was not self-restricting. This Part
also addresses the Court's century-long struggle to address how to
extraterritorially apply the Constitution in alignment with the United
States' increased involvement in foreign affairs. This Part further
emphasizes some key questions about extraterritoriality that the
Court has yet to directly answer. Lastly, this Part addresses the Fifth
Circuit's dismissal of both Hernandez's Fourth and Fifth Amendment
claims and introduces a recent decision from a U.S. District Court
21. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008) (determining specifically the
reach of the Suspension Clause).
22. Id. (emphasizing three factors: (1) citizenship and status of the alien-
detainee; (2) nature of the site where the incident (apprehension and detention)
occurred; and (3) practical obstacles in awarding constitutional protection).
23. See infra notes 73-86 and accompanying text (explaining the Fifth Circuit's
application of Verdugo-Urquidez, and noting one District Court case that applied both
tests to grant Fourth Amendment rights in a case similar to Hernandez).
24. See Jules Lobel, Fundamental Norms, International Law, and the Extraterritorial
Constitution, 36 YALEJ. INT'L L. 307, 320-21 (2011) (suggesting that even if prisoners
were captured in an active war zone, they could be precluded from succeeding in a
habeas proceeding); see also discussion infra Section II.B. (arguing that a uniform
standard will promote clarity for U.S. officials to follow and alert them of possible
apprehension if they were to violate the standard at the U.S.-Mexico border).
2015] 1551
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that applies both Verdugo-Urquidez's and Boumediene's tests to grant
Fourth Amendment protection to an alien at the U.S.-Mexico border.
Part III of this Note argues that Verdugo-Urquidez's narrow
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment's text, "the people," should
be rejected to correspond with the Framers' vision of a Constitution
that allows for unanticipated changes as the United States continues
to evolve. Additionally, this Part advocates that the Court should
adopt Boumediene's three-factor test when determining whether to
apply the Constitution extraterritorially at the U.S.-Mexico border.
In applying Boumediene's three criteria, this Part argues that
Hernandez's status as an innocent foreign national, the vast amount
of control the United States exerts over the U.S.-Mexico border, and
the minimal practical obstacles the government would face if
constitutional protection were granted, all support a conclusion of
extraterritorial application of the Fourth Amendment to Hernandez.
Lastly, this Note concludes that adoption of Boumediene's three-factor
test when determining extraterritorial application of the Constitution
at the U.S.-Mexico border will not only promote clarity among courts
and U.S. officials, but, more importantly, it will reduce the number of
lives lost at the border from unreasonable and excessive force.
1. UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE
CONSTITUTION EXTENDS ABROAD
The Fourth Amendment was initially enacted as a restraint on
governmental misconduct.25 As time elapsed, while the text of the
Amendment never changed, the changing dynamics between the
Justices of the Supreme Court, in addition to the United States'
expansion into foreign territories, resulted in differing
interpretations of the Amendment's meaning.26 For decades, the
Court has struggled to determine to what extent the Constitution
applies outside of the United States.27  Because of the Court's
inability to apply a governing test, there is still confusion among U.S.
25. Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989).
26. See JOSHUA DRESSLER & GEORGE C. THOMAS III, CRIMINAL PROCEDURE
INVESTIGATING CRIME 65 (5th ed. 2013) (characterizing the jurisprudential evolution
of the Fourth Amendment as ajourney of "U-turns" and "zigs and zags").
27. See Bitran, supra note 18, at 232 (explaining that while courts have not
determined the Constitution's reach, it is becoming more important with the United
States' heightened involvement in international affairs).
[Vol. 64:15471552
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officials and courts as to the extraterritorial limits of the
Constitution.28
A. The Origins of the Fourth Amendment
The Fourth Amendment asserts that "Lt]he right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated, and no
Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized."29 The use of excessive, deadly force
is classified as a seizure, subject to the reasonableness clause of the Fourth
Amendment.3" To determine whether a U.S. official acted reasonably,
courts refer to the totality of circumstances test, considering all factors in a
specific context to decide whether the officer acted as a reasonable person
would in that circumstance.31 Scrutiny under the Fourth Amendment's
reasonableness clause is the proper analysis in determining whether an
unreasonable search or seizure has occurred because it explicitly prohibits
any physically intrusive governmental conduct
32
Dating back to the late Nineteenth Century, courts and
commentators have disagreed about whom the Framers intended to
protect under the plain meaning of "the people" in the Fourth
Amendment.3 Two predominant approaches govern the debate as
to whether "the people" in the Fourth Amendment includes only U.S.
28. See infra notes 112-16 and accompanying text (noting how some courts have
disregarded Verdugo-Urquidez and applied their own tests for extraterritorial issues).
29. U.S. CONsT. amend. IV; see Thomas Y. Davies, Recovering the Original Fourth
Amendment, 98 MICH. L. REV. 547, 557-60 (1999) (noting that: (1) the first clause of
the Fourth Amendment, known as the "reasonableness" clause, states a
"comprehensive principle" that restricts the government's power to conduct
unreasonable searches and seizures; and (2) the second clause of the Fourth
Amendment, the "warrant" clause, serves a "more specific purpose" of inhibiting the
government's ability to issue warrants without sufficient probable cause).
30. Tennessee v. Garner, 471 U.S. 1, 7 (1985).
31. See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 395 (1989) (holding that all claims of
the use of excessive force during a seizure must be analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment's "reasonableness tandard"). But see Carvalho, supra note 17, at 258
(stating that courts are still unsure of what constitutes acceptable versus excessive
force by officials under the Fourth Amendment).
32. See Graham, 490 U.S. at 395 (affirming that any governmental physical
intrusion during seizures should not be analyzed under the Due Process Clause
of the Fifth Amendment).
33. See generally In re Ross, 140 U.S. 453 (1891) (establishing one of the first
instances where the Supreme Court was faced with the challenge of deciding the
extraterritoriality of the Constitution).
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citizens or extends to aliens.34 The Federalists, who believe that the
Bill of Rights enumerates preexisting rights, argue that if "the
people" was intended to include only U.S. citizens, then the text
would have used terms such as "freemen," "residents," or "Americans"
to limit the breadth of the Amendment.35 Contrarily, the Anti-
Federalists, who believe the Bill of Rights lists new, fundamental
rights, argue that "the people" was carefully selected by the Framers
to limit the scope of the right's protection to only U.S. citizens.3 6 In
one of the primary cases that sparked the division between the
Federalists and Anti-Federalists, McCulloch v. Maryland,37 the Court
endorsed the Federalist's position when it held that Maryland's effort
to tax a federal bank violated the Supremacy Clause of the
Constitution by emphasizing that the Constitution is unique from
other types of legal documents because its brevity and vagueness
leave room for interpretation.3" The Court further emphasized that
every word in the Constitution was not meant to be exclusive.9
B. Extraterritorial Application of the Fourth Amendment
Due to a rise in international disturbances, the United States began
to reconsider the extent of its involvement in international affairs."0
34. See DRESSLER & THOMAS III, supra note 26, at 65 (explaining that the Supreme
Court has struggled over the years to clarify the meaning of the Fourth Amendment
and has not yet been successful); infra notes 104-07 and accompanying text
(explaining the disagreement between the plurality and concurrence in Verdugo-
Urquidez over the meaning of "the people" in the Fourth Amendment).
35. See infra notes 105-07 (outlining examples indicating that the phrase "we the
people" encompasses more than just U.S. citizens); see also Eric Bentley, Jr., Toward
an International Fourth Amendment: Rethinking Searches and Seizures Abroad After
Verdugo-Urquidez, 27 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 329, 335 (1994) (stating that the
Constitution's silence on its geographical reach and the meaning of "the people" or
"persons" has caused disagreement and contention for centuries).
36. See, e.g., Thomas B. McAffee, The Federal System as Bill of Rights: Original Understandings,
Modern Misreadings, 43 Via. L REv. 17,93 (1998) (stating that the Anti-Federalists attempted to
have the Constitution "comprehensively enumerate the people's rights[, raising] the inference
'that every thing omitted is given to the general government!").
37. 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
38. Id. at 407, 434-36.
39. Id. at 406 ("But there is no phrase in the instrument which... requires that
every thing granted shall be expressly and minutely described.").
40. See Hon. Karen Nelson Moore, Madison Lecture: Aliens and the Constitution, 88
N.Y.U. L. REv. 801, 804-05 (2013) ("Meanwhile, as part of the War on Terror, courts
continue to grapple with the rights due to alien detainees held abroad .... At the
forefront of both immigration and national security ... sit concerns about whether
constitutional guarantees extend beyond the nation's territorial borders, and the way
the Constitution treats these noncitizens has increasing relevance to the operation of
[Vol. 64:15471554
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In light of the War on Terror, courts have increasingly applied a
higher level of scrutiny when extending constitutional rights
extraterritorially."' In prosecuting foreign nationals, courts focus on
the aliens' status and allegiance by looking to whether the alien was
an enemy combatant with strong ties to his or her home country or
simply caught in the wrong place at the wrong time.
42
The Court first faced the question of whether the Constitution extends
beyond U.S. soil in In re Ross,4 3 where it created a blanket rule that
constitutional protection only applies to those within the United States.4
In that case, a U.S. citizen sought a writ of habeas corpus, challenging his
detention for the crimes he committed abroad while on a ship in Japan.5
The Court applied a strict territorial approach by holding that the
Constitution has no force outside of the United States.
46
Towards the end of the Nineteenth Century, the Court eased its
strict territorial approach when faced with the challenging question of
whether incorporated territories received constitutional protection.7
The Insular Cases constitute a compilation of cases in which the Court
determined whether Insular Areas, s such as Puerto Rico, Hawaii, and
the Philippines, were within U.S. territory for the purpose of receiving
government at every level-federal, state, and local.").
41. See id. at 866 (asserting that following the War on Terror, courts must more
thoroughly define how designation as an enemy combatant may impact the
"panoply" of an individual's constitutional rights).
42. See E pate Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942) (explaining that "[b]y universal
agreement and practice [, the law of war draws a distinction between the armed forces and
the peaceful populations of belligerent nations and also between those who are lawful and
unlawful combatants," and giving an example of a belligerent, or enemy, combatant).
43. 140 U.S. 453 (1891).
44. Id. at 464.
45. Id. at 454.
46. Id. at 464 (reasoning that constitutional protection only applied to citizens
and other people physically within U.S. territory and did not extend protection to
non-citizens or even citizens traveling abroad in foreign territory).
47. See Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 306-07 (1922) (denying the Sixth
Amendment right to ajury trial in Puerto Rico because the country's own Bill of Rights
excluded this right); Ocampo v. United States, 234 U.S. 91, 98 (1914) (rejecting Fifth
Amendment grand jury protections in the Philippines); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S.
138, 149 (1904) (rejecting the right to a jury trial in the Philippines); Hawaii v.
Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 217-18 (1903) (refusing to apply grand jury indictment
requirements in Hawaii); Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901) (holding that the
Constitution's Revenue Clauses did not extend to Puerto Rico).
48. Insular areas were considered incorporated territories, areas that are
considered part of the United States, as opposed to unincorporated territories, areas
not governed by U.S. law.
155520151
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constitutional protections.9 The Insular Cases were often interpreted
as extending the entire Constitution to incorporated territories
without the requirement of legislative authorization.5°
Two decades later, the Court backed away from its relaxed
territorial approach in the Insular Cases to deny constitutional
protection to enemy aliens who were never within U.S. territory.5' In
Johnson v. Eisentrager,52 German prisoners5 were "taken into custody
by the United States Army," then "tried and convicted by a Military
Commission. The Court denied the petitioners' writ of habeas
corpus because they were never within U.S. territory and
consequently were outside the country's jurisdiction.5  The Court
emphasized that "[m]ere lawful presence in the [United States]
creates an implied assurance of safe conduct and gives [an alien]
certain rights," and that the Court has extended constitutional
guaranties to resident aliens since 1886.56 Furthermore, the Court
distinguished between the treatment of aliens as an "incident of
alienage" and a stricter treatment of aliens as an "incident of war.
57
In the mid-twentieth century, the Court took a sharp turn and
abandoned its strict territorial approach by extending constitutional
protection to U.S. citizens in a foreign territory.58 In Reid v. Covert,
59
two U.S. citizens located at military posts in Japan petitioned for a
writ of habeas corpus, alleging their military trial was unconstitutional
49. See Bitran, supra note 18, at 233-34 (emphasizing that the Insular Cases
concluded that some constitutional rights applied in their own right to incorporated
territories and even in unincorporated territories, without authorizing legislation).
50. See id. (pointing out, however, that only fundamental constitutional rights
extended to unincorporated territories).
51. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 778 (1950).
52. 339 U.S. 763 (1950).
53. German nationals employed in the armed forces in China were charged with
violating combat laws in China for engaging in continued military activity against the
United States. Id. at 765-66.
54. See id. at 766 (noting that the Commanding General of the United States
Forces in the China Theatre delegated his authority, granted by the Joint Chief of
Staff of the United States, to the Military Commission to try and convict criminals).
55. Id. at 778.
56. See id. at 770-71 (noting that protecting civil and property rights of aliens is
readily equivalent to protecting those of citizens, in contrast to instances of war and
security, which may raise the question of an alien's allegiance).
57. Id. at 772.
58. SeeReid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 5-6 (1957), affg351 U.S. 487 (1956) (expressing that
the "United States is entirely a creature of the Constitution" and dismissing the notion that
the United States can disregard the Bill of Rights and act against citizens abroad).
59. 354 U.S. 1 (1957), affg351 U.S. 487 (1956).
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because they were not provided with their Fifth and Sixth
Amendment rights to a jury and grand jury trial." The Court held
that when reprimanding a U.S. citizen abroad, fundamental
constitutional provisions are not abandoned just because the citizen
is in a foreign territory."' Significantly, the Court overruled In re Ross
because it was not willing to risk American lives and liberties by
denying constitutional protection abroad in favor of preserving a
strict application of the Constitution.6 2
Recently, the Court refused to apply the Constitution to a foreign
national asserting constitutional protection against an unreasonable
search and seizure by U.S. law enforcement." The Verdugo-Urquidez
Court adopted a sufficient connections test to determine whether a
foreign national should receive constitutional protection; the test
analyzes who qualifies as "the people," and therefore receives Fourth
Amendment protection, by determining whether a foreign national
has "developed sufficient connection with [the United States] to be
considered part of the [national] community."64 In Verdugo-Urquidez,
Mexican police officers apprehended the respondent, a Mexican
citizen, in his apartment in Mexico and then transported him to the
U.S. Border Patrol."  The Court rejected the respondent's Fourth
Amendment claim, holding that the Fourth Amendment's plain text,
"the people," precludes constitutional protection of foreign nationals
60. See id. at 3-5 (stating that the Court in the judgment below held the military
trial constitutional because Congress could prescribe procedures for overseas trials
for offenses committed abroad as long as they were reasonable and consistent with
due process); see also Moore, supra note 40, at 866 (noting the Supreme Court's
reasoning that "it would be inconsistent to conclude that aliens and citizens who
violate the laws of war should be treated differently than military members
committing the same offenses").
61. See Rei4 354 U.S. at 6 (characterizing this principle as being "as old as government").
62. Id. at 11-12.
63. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 261 (1990). Six Justices
agreed that an alien is not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection when the
search occurs outside the United States. Id. at 261, 275, 279. FourJustices opined
that aliens must be within the United States and have substantial connections to the
United States to qualify for Fourth Amendment protections. Id. at 261, 274-75; see
GERALD L. NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION: IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS, AND
FUNDAMENTAL LAw 105 (1996) ("Kennedy's concurring opinion diverged so greatly
from Rehnquist's analysis and conclusions that Rehnquist seemed really to be
speaking for a plurality of four.").
64. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 260.
65. ld. at 262-63 (stating that the respondent asserted a Fourth Amendment
violation and moved to suppress the evidence seized during searches of his
apartment in Mexico by U.S. officials).
2015] 1557
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
outside U.S. territory because it protects only U.S. citizens from
arbitrary actions by the government.66 According to the Court, even
if the Fourth Amendment did not preempt the respondent's claim,
the Court still would not have granted him constitutional protection
because he lacked sufficient connections to the United States.67
In 2008, the Court reassessed when to extend extraterritorial
application of the Constitution by applying a functional approach to
determine whether a foreign national located in a foreign country is
entitled to constitutional protection.' The petitioners in Boumediene
were aliens and designated enemy combatants, detained at the U.S.
Naval Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba, who sought writs of habeas
corpus.69 The Court granted the petitioners' habeas corpus rights
based on a three-factor test: first, the status and the citizenship of the
detainee; second, the nature of the site of apprehension and
detention; and third, the potential practical obstacles of granting this
constitutional protection. 7 The Court first focused on the
petitioners' status as enemy combatants, relying less heavily on their
foreign citizenship.7' Second, the Court asserted that "[i]n every
practical sense Guantanamo is not abroad; it is within the constant
jurisdiction of the United States."72  Third, the Court held that
granting courts jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus claims would not
compromise the military mission at Guantanamo Bay.7" This
66. Id. at 266 (describing the Fourth Amendment's purpose as restricting
searches and seizures conducted by the government in domestic matters).
67. Id. at 271 (emphasizing that while the respondent's presence in the
United States was lawful, it was not voluntary, which indicated no substantial
connection with the United States).
68. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 766 (2008).
69. Id. at 732.
70. Id. at 732, 766.
71. See id. at 766-67 (noting the difference between enemy aliens, who are
foreign nationals in a country that is an enemy of the United States, and enemy
combatants, who are foreign nationals actively acting against the United States);
Ludecke v. Watkins, 335 U.S. 160, 162-63 n.3, 173 (1948) (finding that a German
citizen and member of the Nazi Party was deportable as an enemy alien whether
engaged in direct hostilities or not because the Attorney General is authorized to
move forward without judicial review); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 450, 463 n.3 (4th
Cir. 2003) (defining enemy combatants as those persons engaged in "armed struggle").
72. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 768-69 (emphasizing the United States' constant
control at Guantanamo Bay in determining the Constitution's extraterritorial
application). The location of apprehension and detention is important because
under Eisentrager and the Insular Cases, full constitutional protections are only
extended to territories the United States intends to govern indefinitely. Id. at 768.
73. Id. at 769 (stressing that "any judicial process requires some incremental
expenditure of resources" and that civilian and military courts have worked together
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functional approach reflects a practical departure from Verdugo-
Urquidez's sufficient connections test for determining extraterritorial
application of the Fourth Amendment and illustrates an effective test
for reviewing the Fifth Circuit's ruling in Hernandez.
C. The ffh Circuit's Approach toExtratemtoriality and the Future ofBotunediene
Hernandez's parents asserted that Agent Mesa violated their son's
Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights by knowingly adopting
inadequate procedures for the use of excessive, deadly force in
making arrests."1 The Fifth Circuit relied on Verdugo-Urquidez when it
rejected Hernandez's Fourth Amendment claim.7" In doing so, the
Fifth Circuit used Verdugo-Urquidez's restrictive definition of "the
people," encompassing only U.S. citizens, to exclude Hernandez
from protection.7" Moreover, the court argued, even if the Fourth
Amendment's text did not exclude Hernandez because of his
citizenship, Hernandez lacked "sufficient voluntary connections" to
the United States to entitle him to protection.77
On rehearing, the Fifth Circuit affirmed its ruling on the Fourth
Amendment claim, but reversed its prior grant of Fifth Amendment
protection to Hernandez.78 The court held that Hernandez failed to
allege, at the time of the complained incident, a clearly established
right.79 Although the court affirmed that "Agent Mesa showed
callous disregard for Hernandez's Fifth Amendment rights by using
excessive, deadly force when [he] was unarmed and presented no
threat," the court denied extraterritorial application of the Fifth
Amendment because Hernandez's right under the Amendment was
not clearly established."0 The court stated that Agent Mesa would not
have been reasonably forewarned that his conduct might have
in the past without problems).
74. Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 255 (5th Cir. 2014), affd on rehg,
785 F.3d 117 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
75. Id. at 265-66 (refusing to ignore a Supreme Court decision without direct
instruction from the Court itself). Judge James Dennis, in his concurrence,
disagreed with the plurality and stated that questions of extraterritorial application
should "turn on objective factors, and practical concerns," not on formalist
approaches such as in Verdugo-Urquidez. Id. at 280 (Dennis,J., concurring).
76. Id. at 265.
77. Id. at 266 (factoring in Hernandez's Mexican citizenship, his indifference about
staying in the United States, and his lack of acceptance of any societal obligations to
conclude that he did not have a significant voluntary tie to the United States).
78. Hernandez v. United States, 785 F.3d 117, 120 (5th Cir. 2015) (per curiam).
79. Id. at 119.
80. Id. at 120.
2015] 1559
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
violated the Fifth Amendment by emphasizing the lack of applicable
case law in 2010, when the incident took place."' Although the Fifth
Circuit denied application of Boumediene to Hernandez, focusing on
the notion that the Court in Boumediene restricted its ruling to the
specific facts of that case, it left open the possibility of extending
Boumediene to extraterritoriality cases in the future.
8 2
On July 9, 2015, a United States District Court for the District of
Arizona applied both the Verdugo-Urquidez and Boumediene tests in
Rodriguez v. Swartz3 when analyzing whether the Fourth and Fifth
Amendment apply to an alien located at the U.S.-Mexico border.8 4 In
Rodriguez, a minor Mexican national was walking home alone along a
street in Mexico, parallel to the border fence separating the United
States and Mexico; a U.S. Border Patrol agent shot the minor
approximately ten times before he collapsed dead.8" The court
applied both Boumediene's functional approach and Verdugo-Urquidez's
sufficient connections test to grant Fourth Amendment protection. 
86
The court looked to the alien minor's status, citizenship, voluntary
connections, nature of the site when the incident occurred, and
practical obstacles to grant him constitutional protection.7 The
court found that the alien's status was that of a "civilian foreign
national engaged in peaceful activity in another country"88 and that
he had at least one substantial connection to the United States by
emphasizing that his grandparents were legal citizens of the
country.89 Next, the court held that the United States-through its
border patrol agents' use of force-heavily controlled the area in
Mexico immediately adjacent to the border patrol fence.9" And lastly,
the court went on to state that there would be no practical obstacle in
81. Id.
82. Id. at 120-21 ("Reasonable minds can differ on whether Boumediene may
someday be explicitly extended as the plaintiffs urge.").
83. Rodriguez v. Swartz, No. 4:14-CV-02251-RCC (D. Ariz.July 9, 2015).
84. Rodriguez, slip op. at *8.
85. Id. at *2.
86. Id. at *8, *13-16; see id. at *12 ("The Court considers [the Boumediene factors]
along with the 'voluntary connections' test outlined in Verdugo-Urquidez to find that
Rodriguez can assert [her son's] rights pursuant to the Fourth Amendment.").
87. Id. at'13-14.
88. Id. at *13 ("At the time [the U.S. border patrol agent] seized him, [the
minor] was not suspected of, charged with, or convicted of violating any law.").
89. Id. (taking into account that the minor and his family also lived in an
area that previously flowed into an area of the United States, but is now
separated by the U.S.-Mexico border).
90. Id. at *14 ("This control extended to the street, Calle Internacional, where
[the minor] was killed.").
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granting the alien Fourth Amendment protection because the
Mexican government affirmed there would be no conflict with
Mexican laws and customs.91 The court also noted that granting the
alien Fourth Amendment protection would not "plunge [U.S.
officials] 'into a sea of uncertainty"' because the case "addresses only
the use of deadly force by U.S. Border Patrol agents in seizing
individuals at and near the United States-Mexico border."9 2  The
court affirmed the lower court's dismissal of the Fifth Amendment
violation claim because a substantive due process claim "is best
analyzed pursuant to the Fourth Amendment."'
II. BROAD INTERPRETATION OF "THE PEOPLE" AND APPLICATION OF
BOUMEDIENEAT THE U.S.-MExIcO BORDER
When the Framers drafted the Fourth Amendment, they focused
on prohibiting unreasonable and excessive governmental intrusion.9"
The Fourth Amendment is intended to limit how far the
government's authority extends instead of enforcing a concrete list of
whom the amendment protects.5 Boumediene's three-factor approach
helps achieve the goal of preventing government encroachment by
providing a uniform test that analyzes whether the U.S. government
has exceeded its authority and, therefore, whether a foreign national
is entitled to protection against U.S. officials.
A. "[The people" Extends to Aliens
The Framers of the Constitution did not intend for a literal
interpretation of every word so that "every thing omitted is given to the
91. Id. at*15.
92. Id. at *15-16 (U.S. border patrol agents "would require no additional
training to determine when it is appropriate to use deadly force against
individuals (whether citizens or noncitizens alike) located on the Mexican side
of the United States-Mexico border").
93. Id. at* 16.
94. See Victor C. Romero, Note, Whatever Happened to the Fourth Amendment?:
Undocumented Immigrants' Rights After INS v. Lopez-Mendoza and United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 65 S. CAL. L. REv. 999, 1016 (1992) ("[T]he Bill of Rights was
expressly adopted to ensure that the federal government would not encroach upon
the inherent rights of the people and the states.").
95. See Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 13 (1957) (stating that the Constitution did not
apply to certain recently conquered or acquired territories of the United States
under the Insular Cases).
96. See Lobel, supra note 24, at 320-21 (stating that Boumediene's ruling did not allow
any enemy in a war zone to assert a writ of habeas corpus challenge, but rather the court
would decide on a case-by-case basis whether an alien would be entitled to protection).
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general government" or precluded from protection.97 Instead, the
Constitution requires a broad interpretation to adapt to U.S. social and
political values as they continue to evolve."8 Specifically, if the Fourth
Amendment was supposed to be an all-inclusive, unchanging
provision, then the Framers would have specified that "the people"
included "residents," "citizens," or "Americans" as they did for other
provisions, such as in the requirements for political office.9'
The Framers created a Constitution vague enough to adapt to the
United States's continuous expansion and acquisition of new
territories. 0 ' When the United States began expanding and
acquiring new territories at a faster pace, Congress utilized the
Constitution's adaptive nature by statutorily granting people in the
newly acquired territories constitutional protection.1 1 Initially, the
Court rejected the blanket rule that the Constitution did not apply at
all overseas.10 2 Instead, the Court ruled that the Constitution might
not apply in its entirety abroad because some provisions may not
comport to other foreign countries' political composition. 10
97. See McAffee, supra note 36, at 93-94 (according tojames Madison, the limitations
in the Constitution were necessary exceptions to the government's power and not to the
"nonexistent or general powers" that the Bill of Rights proposed); see also United States v.
Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 288 (1990) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("The
enumeration in the Constitution of certain rights, shall not be construed to deny or
disparage others retained by the people." (quoting U.S. CONST. amend. IX)).
98. See Moore, supra note 40, at 803 (stating that when James Madison wrote the
Bill of Rights, he anticipated that aliens had rights under the Constitution; his broad
interpretation stresses that the country has long recognized aliens' rights).
99. See id. at 807 (expressing that the Bill of Rights' omission of citizens "speaks
volumes" about the understanding of aliens' protection); see also Verdugo-Urquidez, 494
U.S. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (opining that restricting the group of people
protected by the Constitution is wrong because the Constitution itself does not expressly
contain such an expression or designation of parties); T. Alexander Aleinikoff, Citizens,
Aliens, Membership and the Constitution, 7 CONST. COMMENT. 9, 22 (1990) (asserting that the
Constitution does not distinguish between citizens and aliens; rather, its primary concern
is "persons," which includes both citizens and aliens).
100. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 755 (2008) (explaining that for most of
the country's history, there was little need for courts to pinpoint how far the
Constitution expanded because there were few international issues).
101. Id. at 755-56.
102. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 74 (1957).
103. Id. at 74-75 (concluding from In re Ross and the Insular Cases that there is no
bright-line rule that every provision of the Constitution must apply to Americans in
all foreign jurisdictions; rather, factors such as "the particular local setting, the
practical necessities, and the possible alternatives" are the relevant considerations in
addressing the extraterritorial application of the Constitution).
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The Justices in Verdugo-Urquidez even contradicted themselves while
debating who "the people" in the text of the Fourth Amendment
encompassed. While the Court applied a strict interpretation of "the
people" in the Fourth Amendment by stressing that the text only
encompasses U.S. citizens, 104 the same plurality offered the opposite
argument that the word "persons" is a "relatively universal term" in
reference to the text of the Fifth Amendment's Due Process
Clause.'0 5 Justice Kennedy, concurring, stressed that the right of "the
people" could conversely be interpreted as emphasizing the
importance of the right against arbitrary action by the government,
not as restricting the category of people entitled to protection." "
Justice Kennedy urged that the Fourth Amendment balances the
judicial systems by reinforcing that no one is above the law.'07
B. Uniformity and Guidance is Needed at the U.S.-Mexico Border
The sufficient connections test articulated in Verdugo-Urquidez has
left courts and U.S. officials exercising drastically different levels of
discretion.""t The standard formulated in Verdugo-Urquidez creates
various complications because it is too broad and arbitrary, allowing
104. See Bentley, supra note 35, at 345-46 (emphasizing that most commentators
disagreed with the Chief Justice's interpretation in Verdugo-Urquidez by arguing,
similar to Justice Brennan, that "the Constitution generally should follow the United
States whenever the government acts beyond national borders").
105. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 269 (1990); see Yick Wo v.
Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356, 369 (1886) (recognizing that "any person" included aliens as
well as citizens); THE AMERICAN HERITAGE DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE 1306
(5th ed. 2014) (stating that "people" is "[o]ften treated as a plural of person"); see also
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365, 372 (1971) (expanding Yick Wo and applying
strict scrutiny to aliens because they are "a prime example of a 'discrete and insular'
minority"). But cf. Plyer v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982) (rejecting undocumented
aliens as members of "a suspect class").
106. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 276 (Kennedy, J., concurring). See generally
Romero, supra note 94, at 1011 (mentioning that the American Civil Liberties Union
argued that the Framers' use of the term "the people" was not meant to imply some
great interpretation, but instead was simply used to "avoid awkward phrasing").
107. Romero, supra note 94, at 1016 (emphasizing that the Fourth Amendment was
created to limit the executive branch from engaging in "overzealous behavior.., by
requiring law enforcement agents to seek the approval of the judiciary"); see Verdugo-
Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 276 ("The restrictions that the United States must observe with
reference to aliens beyond its territory or jurisdiction depend ... on general principles
of interpretation, not on an inquiry as to who formed the Constitution or a
construction that some rights are mentioned as being those of 'the people."').
108. See Carvalho, supra note 17, at 275 (stating that the Court in Verdugo-Urquidez
did not even clearly define what was required under the sufficient connections test to
entitle aliens to constitutional protection).
2015] 1563
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
each judge to decide what constitutes "substantial connections" to the
United States. '09 Courts consider a host of differing factors when
determining how significant an alien's connection with the United
States is: their "immigration status, physical proximity to the United
States (or to its borders), lawfulness of presence, and allegiance to
the country.""0  Lower courts have discretionally applied the
sufficient connections test because the variety of factors that can be
applied when determining constitutionality has led to situations
where the determinative factor may be arbitrarily chosen.
After Verdugo-Urquidez's ruling, courts have varied in their
interpretation of the standard; courts either apply a weak standard of
review, or strictly apply the rule."' Prior to the sufficient connections
test, there was a presumption that aliens in the United States,
authorized or unauthorized, enjoyed constitutional protection simply
because they were within U.S. territory."2  Verdugo-Urquidez added a
new element of deciding whether aliens, even in U.S. territory, were
entitled to constitutional protection; therefore, the long-standing
territorial approach to determining constitutional protections of
aliens was significantly diminished."3 Despite the Court's ruling in
109. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 271; see Moore, supra note 40, at 803-04
(explaining that many "unauthorized aliens" are in the United States illegally, which
prevents them from developing a significant connection to the United States, but
they still have extensive ties to the local communities, have lived in the United States
for years, and are parents of U.S. citizens).
110. Moore, supra note 40, at 804; see Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 287
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (noting that the plurality acknowledged that the
sufficient connections test is not conclusive, and that a Justice in the plurality
went even further to state that he could not use the reference to "the people" as
a means of restricting the Fourth Amendment's protections).
111. Compare United States v. Guitterez, 983 F. Supp. 905, 915 (N.D. Cal. 1998)
(indicating that the Court was not required to find that the alien established sufficient
connections with the United States to allow Fourth Amendment protections), revd on
other grounds, 203 F.3d 833 (9th Cir. 1999), and United States v. Iribe, 806 F. Supp. 917,
919 (D. Colo. 1992) (declining to apply the sufficient connections test for an application
of constitutional protection against the Fourth Amendment's unreasonable searches and
seizures), revd in part on other grounds, 11 F.3d 1553 (10th Cir. 1993), with United States v.
Esparza-Mendoza, 265 F. Supp. 2d 1254, 1271 (D. Utah 2003) (holding that an alien
felon who had previously been in the United States, but was then deported, did not have
sufficient connections to receive Fourth Amendment protection unless he could prove
that he was in the country lawfully).
112. See Carvalho, supra note 17, at 275 (stating that because of this
presumption, at least one circuit court has "looked to pre-Verdugo-Urquidez
decisions to determine that nonresident immigrants have a clearly established
right to Fourth Amendment protection").
113. See Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. at 265 (articulating that the new standard for
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Verdugo-Urquidez, courts have continued to find that aliens located
within U.S. territory are beneficiaries of constitutional rights.
114
Specifically, many courts regarded the sufficient connections test as
"mere dictum in a divided opinion" or "assum[ed] that an alien
voluntarily within the United States automatically had [sufficient]
connections" with the United States."5  In effect, Verdugo-Urquidez's
sufficient connections test is a "wild card of sorts" because courts
apply a different discretionary standard when determining who
qualifies for constitutional protection.116
Boumediene's functional approach, even though it derived the idea of
fundamental fairness from Reid and the Insular Cases, was the first time
the Court drastically departed from prior case law on extraterritorial
application of the Constitution. 7 "It was the first time the Court held a
statute unconstitutional under the Suspension Clause.""l8 It was also the
first time the Court granted "a noncitizen with no prior connections to
the United States" protection under the Constitution when the incident
happened in a foreign territory.' ' Finally, it was the first time that a
judicial majority on the Court accepted a functional approach to analyze
how far the Constitution applied extraterritorially. '20
The test's first factor emphasizes an individual's status-for example,
whether the foreign national is an enemy of the United States-not his
or her citizenship.12' U.S. law recognizes the inherent distinctions
determining whether the Constitution applies to aliens will be whether the aliens
have developed a sufficient connection to the United States).
114. See D. Carolina Ntifiez, Inside the Border, Outside the Law: Undocumented Immigrants
and the Fourth Amendment 85 S. CAL. L. REV. 85, 90 (2011) (describing how many courts
dismissed the substantial connections test and continued to assume, for a decade after the
Verdugo-Urquidez decision, that the Constitution protects aliens in the United States).
115. Id. (noting that it took courts almost a decade to even consider
implementing Verdugo-Urquidez's ubstantial connections test).
116. Id. at 91. "In the hands of some courts and commentators, Verdugo stands for
the proposition that territory is the ultimate determinant of constitutional rights.
For others, it represents a move away from a territory-based model and toward an
approach that values human connections and ties." Id.
117. See Bitran, supra note 18, at 238 (noting how the Court in Boumediene
emphasized the Insular Cases' primary focus on fundamental rights in creating the
three-factor test); see also Sarah H. Cleveland, Embedded International Law and the
Constitution Abroad, 110 COLUM. L. REv. 225, 274 (2010) ("Boumediene's rejection of
formal territorial restrictions and citizenship requirements, and its focus on practical
control for determining when constitutional rights limit governmental conduct abroad,
largely comport with modern international law's focus on effective control.").
118. Bitran, supra note 18, at 238.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 727 (2008) (explaining that the Court primarily
2015] 1565
AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW
between aliens of ally and enemy nations, and between resident aliens
who adhere to U.S. law and nonresident aliens who abide by their
country's laws. 122 For example, the Alien Enemy Act differentiated
between aliens by classifying enemy aliens under their own limited
jurisprudence by holding that "apprehension, restraint, and removal of
alien enemies" is allowed at the executive order of the President. 123
The second factor in Boumediene's three-factor test is the nature of
the site where the incident occurred. 124 The Court held it reasonable
to inquire into the "objective degree of control the [United States]
asserts over foreign territory."'' 25 Courts should not simply look to a
territory's sovereignty in the broad sense of dominion; rather, courts
should also refer to the territory's sovereignty in a narrow, legal sense
as a claim of right.126  A broad approach to territorial sovereignty
allows "a territory to be under the de jure sovereignty of one nation,
while under the plenary control... of another."'
' 27
The last factor enunciated in Boumediene is a balancing test to
determine whether the practical obstacles of applying constitutional
protection outweigh the consequences that might follow if application
is granted.2  The Court warned that holding the Bill of Rights and
other constitutional provisions inapplicable when they are
inconvenient to apply, or when an emergency might require flexibility
with the provisions' requirements, could set a significant precedent. 1
29
Abandoning constitutional provisions destroys the benefit of having a
written Constitution and undermines the government's credibility. 1
30
focused on the petitioners' stats as enemy combatants, not their foreign citizenships).
122. Johnson v. Eisentrager, 339 U.S. 763, 769 (1950) (distinguishing between
enemy aliens loyal to their countries and innocent resident aliens who have
submitted to United States laws).
123. See Moore, supra note 40, at 809 (clarifying that "the term 'enemy' does not
cleanly divide citizens from aliens [because] citizens can be enemies too").
124. Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 766.
125. Id. at 754 (requiring courts to have a broad interpretation of sovereignty
when analyzing this factor).
126. See id. (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS § 206 cmt. b
(1986)) ("noting that sovereignty 'implies a state's lawful control over its territory
generally to the exclusion of other states, authority to govern in that territory, and
authority to apply law there"').
127. See id. at 768-69 (explaining how Guantanamo Bay is significantly different
than the territories in the Insular Cases and Eisentrager because the government only
temporarily governed the insular areas and the prison in Germany).
128. Id. at 766, 769.
129. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957).
130. Id. (emphasizing that if the United States' commitment to foreign countries
conflicts with compliance with the Constitution, then the Constitution should be
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Verdugo-Urquidez's sufficient connections test and Boumediene's
functional approach are incompatible approaches to determine the
Constitution's extraterritorial application.13" ' Verdugo-Urquidez's
sufficient connections test focuses on arbitrary factors that
Boumediene's approach does not weigh heavily on, such as whether the
alien made an effort to integrate himself or herself within U.S.
comnunities."' Instead, Boumediene's functional approach provides
courts a clear, uniform three-factor test to apply when determining
whether aliens are entitled to constitutional protection.3
C. Boumediene Applied to Hernandez
The Fifth Circuit incorrectly applied Verdugo-Urquidez's test to
Hernandez; it should have instead applied Boumediene's approach to
analyze the Fourth Amendment claim. On appeal, the Fifth Circuit
reversed Hernandez's right to Fifth Amendment protection that
precluded him from receiving any constitutional protection at all.
The Court should adopt Boumediene's approach as the standard for
determining whether an alien is granted constitutional protection at
the U.S.-Mexico border to provide aliens who have been unjustifiably
harmed by U.S. officials an opportunity for protection.
1. Hernandez's citizenship and status
Although Hernandez is not a U.S. citizen, his status as an innocent
alien demands greater attention in determining whether he should
be granted constitutional protection.3" Unlike the enemy aliens
detained in Eisentrager, the Mexican national accused of murder and
drug crimes in Verdugo-Urquidez, or the enemy combatants detained
under AUMF in Boumediene, Hernandez was an innocent civilian.'
amended to adhere to U.S. international policy).
131. Hernandez v. United States, 757 F.3d 249, 280 (5th Cir. 2014) (Dennis, J.,
concurring) (disagreeing with the majority's belief that Verdugo-Urquidez's test could
be reconciled with Boumediene's three-factor approach). See, e.g., supra notes 87-91
and accompanying text (applying both Verdugo-Urquidez's and Boumediene's tests in a
district of Arizona case that demonstrates the complexity of determining which
factors from which test are determinative in determining constitutional protection).
132. See, e.g., Nat'l Council of Resistance of Iran v. Dep't of State, 251 F.3d
192, 204 (D.C. Cir. 2001) (granting constitutional protection to alien petitioners
because their bank account in the United States demonstrated they had
substantial connections to the country).
133. See supra notes 121-30 and accompanying text (elaborating on
Boumediene's three-factor test).
134. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 268-69.
135. See Bitran, supra note 18, at 249 (emphasizing the Court's willingness to
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Hernandez's status as an innocent Mexican national outside a war
zone, in addition to the two remaining Boumediene factors, weighs
more heavily towards granting constitutional protection and
reprimanding Agent Mesa for his unreasonable behavior.136 From a
policy standpoint, the Court should consider granting constitutional
rights to aliens far from war zones and not held in U.S. custody. 1
3 7
2. Nature of the U.S.-Mexico border
The Court should reject Verdugo-Urquidez's ufficient connections
test because Verdugo-Urquidez's residence in Mexico, where the
constitutional violation occurred, is inherently different than the
U.S.-Mexico border, where Hernandez was killed. In Verdugo-
Urquidez, the Court centered on the respondent's apartment in
Mexico, where the United States exerted no control.13 In contrast,
the nature of the U.S.-Mexico border is more similar to Guantanamo
Bay in Boumediene because the United States exerts a significant
amount of control in both territories. 1
39
The United States exercises extensive control over the U.S.-Mexico
border.' The border between the United States and Mexico is over
2000 miles long and "is the busiest in the world, with over 350 million
crossings per year."'4' In the most recent decade, "the number of
Border Patrol agents has doubled from approximately 10,000 to more
than 21,000 agents" primarily focusing on the Southwest border.
14 2
extend constitutional protection to foreign enemies in Boumediene and that it would
be unjust to deny an innocent foreign national constitutional protection).
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. See United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 262 (1990) (detailing
the DEA's investigation and process to obtain a warrant to search the Respondent's
residence in Mexico); see also Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957) (rejecting the
application of other cases that did not involve military tribunals because they
followed traditional rules developed by Congress and were too dissimilar).
139. See Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 269 (differentiating Guantanamo and Landsberg
Prison from the U.S.-Mexico border because Hernandez does not require application
of the Constitution in a far-away location).
140. See id. (concluding that U.S. agents "exercise hard power across the border"
when they injure individuals with the use of force).
141. Id. at 266. The U.S.-Mexico border is known to be extremely violent; due to
the large number of illegal immigrants coming from Mexico to the United States,
Mexican nationals have been victimized at higher rates than illegal immigrants from
any other country. See Romero, supra note 94, at 1001-02 (suggesting that illegal
immigrants from Mexico frequently have their Fourth Amendment rights violated by
INS agents-now called ICE agents).
142. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 267.
[Vol. 64:15471568
SHOOT FIRST, ASK LATER
The U.S. Department of Homeland Security has advanced its
technology to increase border surveillance by using "mobile
surveillance units, thermal imaging systems, and large- and small-scale
non-intrusive inspection equipment, ... 124 aircraft and six
Unmanned Aircraft Systems operating along the Southwest
border."' Therefore, the U.S. Border Patrol agents maintain a
constant presence in Mexico as opposed to troops who temporarily
occupy a foreign country during wartime.'4
The Chief of the U.S. Border Patrol explained that the U.S. border
security policy intentionally extends the nation's defense outward to
ensure that the physical U.S.-Mexico border is one of many lines of
defense."' For example, U.S. Border Patrol agents at times cross
over the border.'46 Even though Agent Mesa was in the United States
when he shot Hernandez, he was only steps away from where the
constitutional violation, Hernandez's death, occurred.4 The Deputy
Solicitor General acknowledged that "while the government can
summarily exclude such an alien, it couldn't just 'shoot him."" 48
3. Practical obstacles of applying the Fourth Amendment o Hernandez
Granting Hernandez Fourth Amendment protection would not
burden the U.S. Border Patrol agents' mission of securing the nation's
border. The Court in Verdugo-Urquidez reasoned that applying Fourth
Amendment protection to foreign nationals who have no ties to the
United States would plunge the agents into "a sea of uncertainty as to
what might be reasonable in the way of searches and seizures
conducted abroad.""' Having a Supreme Court ruling that permits
143. Id.
144. Id. at 269 (explaining that even when the U.S. Border Patrol agents remain
on U.S. soil, their power extends across the U.S.-Mexico border because their use of
force crosses the border and injures people in Mexico).
145. See Bitran, supra note 18, at 245-47 (noting that in the mid-to-late Twentieth
Century, the United States sent agents into Mexican territory during drug
enforcement operations); see also Marjorie Florestal, Terror on the High Seas: The Trade
and Development Implications of U.S. National Security Measures, 72 BROOK. L. REv. 385,
390-91 (2007) (explaining that the U.S. government's strategy for national defense
was to "extend the zone of security outward" after 9/11).
146. Hernandez, 757 F.3d at 269.
147. See id. (stating that "Border Patrol agents exercise hard power across the
border at least as far as their U.S.-based use of force injures individuals").
148. Lobel, supra note 24, at 315 (emphasis added).
149. United States v. Verdugo-Urquidez, 494 U.S. 259, 274 (1990); see id. at 278
(Kennedy, J., concurring) (explaining that because Fourth Amendment analysis
abides by a "reasonableness" standard, Border Patrol agents might be confused as to
what is considered reasonable).
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aliens at the U.S.-Mexico border to bring Fourth Amendment claims
against U.S. Border Patrol agents would not cause confusion as to what
is reasonable behavior.5 ' Conversely, it would clarify the perplexing
standard that Verdugo-Urquidez has left courts to apply. 5' Looking at
Hernandez, it is difficult to refute that Agent Mesa acted unreasonably
when, under no threat to national or agent safety, he chose to shoot
and kill an innocent Mexican minor hiding behind a cement pillar. 1
52
Due to the United States's significant involvement in international
affairs, it is especially crucial to maintain good relations with other
countries, especially ones bordering the United States.153 Typically,
aliens lack remedial measures for constitutional violations that
occurred in the United States because either the alien's home
country has "little political leverage or doesn't... support the alien's
claim."154 The current U.S. Border Patrol policy leaves individuals at
the U.S.-Mexico border at risk of death or serious harm at the hands
of U.S. Border Patrol agents. 155 If the government were able to claim
that practical obstacles precluded enforcement of Fourth
Amendment rights extraterritorially, it would permit the executive
branch to operate in a law-free zone at the U.S.-Mexico border. 151
150. See id. at 292-93 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (explaining that the Executive
Branch's ability to conduct foreign affairs will not be impaired because the doctrine
of official immunity still protects agents, and that constitutional rights do not always
need to be applied abroad).
151. See supra notes 108-16 and accompanying text (emphasizing how courts
have applied different standards of deference when using Verdugo-Urquidez's
sufficient connections test).
152. See Carvalho, supra note 17, at 275 (stating that beating "a defenseless
immigrant without provocation" has been found to be a use of excessive force).
153. See generally Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957) (stating that if the United
States' foreign commitments alter in such a way that makes the Constitution
ineffective, the Constitution should be amended).
154. See Lobel, supra note 24, at 314 (noting that an alien can still "claim the
protection of customary international law and treaties that proscribe certain
governmental action"; however, these remedies usually are unenforceable in U.S.
courts against the U.S. government).
155. See Guillermo Alonso Meneses, Human Rights and Undocumented Migration
Along the Mexican-U.S. Border, 51 UCLA L. REv. 267, 269 (2003) (stating that "since
1998[,] there have been more than three hundred deaths every year" at the U.S.-
Mexico border); see also Bitran, supra note 18, at 249-50 (arguing that allowing
"noncitizens to bring claims of excessive deadly force under the Fourth Amendment
reduces the threat[] to citizens and [noncitizens] that executive agents will 'switch
the Constitution on or off at will"').
156. See Bentley, supra note 35, at 348 (explaining that another issue with
Verdugo-Urquidez's holding is that such a strict interpretation of the Constitution's
Fourth Amendment protections as applying to only U.S. citizens would leave
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CONCLUSION
Boumediene and Verdugo-Urquidez, read together, leave uncertain how
courts will determine whether to extend constitutional protection to
aliens outside of the United States. 157 The Supreme Court's adoption of
Boumediene's functional approach would prevent lower courts from
applying an unsound standard and allow flexibility in a constantly
evolving country.15' Lower courts have successfully applied Boumediene's
test even in circumstances where the United States does not exercise the
same degree of control that it exerts in Guantanamo Bay. 15,)
There are too many lives at stake for a retroactive policy and a
judicial system that does not guarantee a remedy for aliens who have
suffered from excessive force at the hands of U.S. officials. The
Framers did not intend to have a self-restricting Constitution.
Instead, they drafted a broad document to allow the text to acquire
new meaning over time. Consequently, with the United States's
significant involvement in international affairs, it is critical for the
United States to continue its commitment to international human
rights. Extending Fourth Amendment protection to people at the
U.S.-Mexico border will help accomplish this goal. Moreover,
Boumediene's test does not automatically grant Constitutional rights;
rather, the three-prong test will only extend protection if it is
reasonably fair to do so in a specific case.
In Hernandez, the Fourth Amendment should apply to the incident
at the U.S.-Mexico border because this functional approach assures a
just result. Hernandez was an innocent foreign national in a territory
noncitizens without any kind of remedy).
157. See Nrfiez, supra note 114, at 134 (stating that after Boumediene, Verdugo-
Urquidez's test has to be "interpreted to adopt a post-territorial approach to the
Fourth Amendment... that rejects presence within the United States as sufficient"
to entitle an alien to Fourth Amendment protection).
158. See Lobel, supra note 24, at 323 (describing how the test in Boumediene has to
be used case-by-case and that the Court has to sometimes use "pragmatic
considerations to avoid addressing or even trumping constitutional principles"); see
also Moore, supra note 40, at 845-46 (stating that the Ninth Circuit attempted to
combine Verdugo-Urquidez and Boumediene to make a flexible, functional calculation
that permitted the alien to invoke constitutional protection because five years of
studying in the United States constitutes a substantial connection and that the alien's
travels abroad demonstrated her intent to further the connection).
159. See, e.g., Al Maqaleh v. Gates, 605 F.3d 84, 93-97 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (applying
the three-factor test from Boumediene and concluding that Bagram was in a theater of
war where the United States lacked de jure or de facto sovereignty, and most
importantly, where the practical obstacles of active hostilities precluded the
detainees from asserting the protection of the Suspension Clause).
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where the United States has extensive control. Additionally, the
United States would not face any significant difficulty in extending
constitutional protection to Hernandez. The unique circumstances
between the United States and Mexico require cooperation between
the two countries to ensure that both of the countries' citizens are
protected.1" In determining what rights and principles are
fundamental abroad, courts should take into account what rights the
international community considers to be fundamental in addition to
American values and culture.'"'
160. See Bitran, supra note 18, at 247 (arguing that "a lower threshold than de
facto sovereignty" should be enforced in order to protect constitutional rights).
161. See Lobel, supra note 24, at 325 (reinforcing that Boumediene's ruling is
"consistent with ... the older due process jurisprudence for determining the
applicability of constitutional norms to U.S. actions abroad").
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